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*Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.*

## STATE v. PIKE.

Murder committed in perpetrating a robbery is murder of the first degree, although not committed with a deliberate and premeditated design to kill.

Under an indictment, alleging that the accused "feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder," the jury may return a verdict of "guilty of murder in the first degree" upon proof of murder by deliberate and premeditated killing. (DOE, J., and SMITH, J., dissenting.)

Under such an indictment, the jury may return a verdict of "guilty of murder in the first degree" upon proof of murder committed in perpetrating robbery.

The order in which parties shall exercise the right of challenge, is a matter within the discretion of the court at the trial term.

Whether a juror is "indifferent," and whether a confession was made in consequence of inducements, are questions of fact, to be decided by the judge presiding at the trial; and no exception lies to his finding.

An "impression" formed by one called as a juror, not strong enough to be likely to prevent a candid judgment upon a full hearing of the evidence, does not disqualify him to be sworn as a juror.

Any witness may testify, that a person was intoxicated, or under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The opinion of a witness, who is not an expert, as to the sanity of a respondent, is incompetent, although formed from observation of the respondent's appearance and conduct. (DOE, J., dissenting.)

Whether there is such a disease as dipsomania, and whether a respondent had that disease, and whether an act done by him was the product of such disease, are questions of fact for the jury.

The respondent requested the court to charge, that the respondent's sanity is a fact to be proved by the state beyond all reasonable doubt; that there is no legal presumption of sanity, which can have any weight with the jury as a matter of law; and, that there is no legal presumption of sanity which is a substitute for evidence, or which, as a matter of law, affects the burden of proof in criminal cases. The court declined so to instruct the jury; but instructed them, "that every person of mature age is presumed to be sane, until there is evidence tending to show insanity, but when there is evidence coming from either side, tending to show insanity, then the state must satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the prisoner is sane." *Held*, that the respondent had no ground of exception.

The defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, upon the following indictment:—

## "STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,

"Rockingham, ss.

"At the Supreme Judicial Court, holden at Portsmouth, within and for the county of Rockingham aforesaid, on the third Tuesday of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, the grand jurors for the state of New Hampshire, upon their oath, present that Josiah L. Pike, late of Newburyport, in the county of Essex and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, yeoman, on the 7th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-

eight, at Hampton Falls, in the county of Rockingham aforesaid, with force and arms, in and upon one Thomas Brown, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault—and that the said Josiah L. Pike, with a certain axe of the value of one dollar, which he, the said Josiah L. Pike, in both his hands, then and there had and held, him, the said Thomas Brown, in and upon the left side of the head of him, the said Thomas Brown, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did strike and beat—giving to the said Thomas Brown then and there, with the axe aforesaid and by the stroke aforesaid, in the manner aforesaid, in and upon the left side of the head of him, the said Thomas Brown, one mortal wound of the length of four inches and of the depth of one inch, of which said mortal wound the said Thomas Brown, from the said 7th day of May aforesaid, in the year aforesaid, until the 13th day of the same month of May in the year aforesaid, at Hampton Falls aforesaid, did languish, and languishing did live—on which said 13th day of May aforesaid, in the year aforesaid, the said Thomas Brown, at Hampton Falls aforesaid, in the said county of Rockingham, of the wound aforesaid died.

“And so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do say that the said Josiah L. Pike, him the said Thomas Brown, on the said 7th day of May aforesaid, in the year aforesaid, at Hampton Falls aforesaid, in the said county of Rockingham, in manner and form aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state.”

The Chief Justice, at the trial, instructed the jury that if the defendant murdered said Brown by deliberate and premeditated killing, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate robbery, the verdict should be guilty of murder in the first degree; to which instructions defendant excepted. A jury was obtained without calling all the jurors in attendance. The defendant peremptorily challenged sixteen. The defendant excepted to the ruling of the court allowing the state to set aside one juror without assigning cause, after he had been examined on oath by counsel on both sides, and defendant's counsel had stated that they did not object to his being sworn as a juror. It was within the knowledge of the court that this juror was a relation of one of the defendant's counsel. J. F. Tenney, drawn as juror, testified as follows: “I read the reports in the newspaper, and from them derived the impression that the defendant was guilty. Taking those reports to be true, I should think the defendant guilty; but I pay little attention to such reports; notwithstanding what I read in the newspaper, and the impression I received from the reading of it, I think I could try the defendant on the evidence without prejudice; I think I have no opinion or impression which would prevent me from trying him impartially on the evidence.”

Upon this testimony the court found, as matter of fact, that said Tenney was indifferent, and he was sworn as a juror, and defendant excepted.

One Leavitt, keeper of the jail to which defendant was committed by a magistrate, testified as follows: “I've no recollection that I told him it would be better for him if there was an accomplice found; he may have inferred that it would be better for him if an accomplice were

found ; I possibly may have told him so, but I have no recollection of it ; I did not at any time hold out any inducement to him to make a confession. At the time he made the statement and before he made it, I told him I might be obliged to testify to it, and it might go against him."

Upon this testimony the court ruled that a confession made by defendant to Leavitt was not made in consequence of inducement held out by Leavitt, and Leavitt was allowed to testify to such confession, and defendant excepted.

Witnesses, not experts, were allowed to testify for the state that at different times defendant was and was not intoxicated, and did and did not appear to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and defendant excepted. Witnesses, not experts, called by the defendant were not allowed to testify that from their observations of his appearance and conduct before the alleged murder, they formed the opinion that he was insane, and defendant excepted.

A witness called by defendant testified that a few days before the alleged murder, the defendant came to the witness's shop in Newburyport, and said and did various things there, and that the witness shut up his shop and started to go away. The defendant offered to prove by this witness that the reason of his shutting up his shop and starting to go away was, that he was afraid of defendant on account of his excited and wild appearance and conduct on that occasion. The court excluded the evidence and defendant excepted. Another witness called by defendant testified to the appearance and conduct of defendant at another time when they retired to the same bed in the evening, and that witness rose after defendant went to sleep, and went to sleep in another bed. The defendant offered to prove by this witness that the reason of his going to another bed was, that he was afraid of defendant on account of his excited and wild appearance and conduct on that occasion. The court excluded the evidence, and defendant excepted.

The defendant's counsel claimed that the defendant was irresponsible by reason of a species of insanity called dipsomania. The court instructed the jury, as requested by the defendant, that if they found that the defendant killed Brown in a manner that would be criminal and unlawful if the defendant were sane, the verdict should be "not guilty by reason of insanity," if the killing was the offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant ; that neither delusion nor knowledge of right and wrong, nor design or cunning in planning and executing the killing and escaping or avoiding detection, nor ability to recognise acquaintances, or to labor or transact business or manage affairs is, as a matter of law, a test of mental disease ; but that all symptoms and all tests of mental disease are purely matters of fact to be determined by the jury."<sup>1</sup>

The court also instructed the jury that whether there is such a mental disease as dipsomania, and whether defendant had that disease, and whether the killing of Brown was the product of such disease, were questions of fact for the jury, to which instruction the defendant excepted.

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<sup>1</sup> These instructions were held correct in *State v. Jones* in the same court. (To be reported in 49 N. H.)

The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that the sanity—the mental capacity of the defendant to commit any crime charged in the indictment—is a fact to be proved by the state beyond all reasonable doubt: that there is no legal presumption of sanity, which can have any weight with the jury as a matter of law; that there is no legal presumption of sanity which is a substitute for evidence, or which, as a matter of law, affects the burden of proof in criminal cases. The court declined so to instruct the jury, and defendant excepted.

The court instructed the jury that every person of mature age is presumed to be sane until there is evidence tending to show insanity; but when there is evidence coming from either side tending to show insanity, then the state must satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the prisoner is sane; to which instructions the defendant excepted.

The defendant moved to set aside the verdict, the court overruled the motion, and the defendant filed this bill of exceptions, which was allowed and signed by the court.

*Goodall and Frink*, for respondent.

*Attorney-General and Solicitor*, for State.

SMITH, J.—“All murder committed by poison, starving, torture, or other deliberate and premeditated killing, or committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, is murder of the first degree; and all murder not of the first degree is of the second degree.” Gen. Stat. ch. 264, sect. 1.

“If the jury shall find any person guilty of murder, they shall, by their verdict, find also whether it is of the first or second degree.” Gen. Stat. ch. 264, sect. 2.

“If any person shall plead guilty to an indictment for murder, the court having cognisance of the offence shall determine the degree.” Gen. Stat. ch. 264, sect. 3.

“In indictments for causing the death of any person, it is not necessary to set forth the manner in which or the means by which the death of the deceased was caused; but it is sufficient in every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased, and in every indictment for manslaughter to charge that the defendant did feloniously kill and slay the deceased.” Gen. Stat. ch. 242, sect. 14.

1. The respondent takes the position that murder committed in perpetrating a robbery is not murder of the first degree unless committed with a deliberate and premeditated design to kill.

This is untenable. The term “murder” in sect. 1, ch. 264, Gen. Stat., is intended to include all kinds of unlawful killing which were murder at common law, or in other words, “the several offences which are included under the general denomination of murder” at common law. At common law the killing of a man while the slayer was engaged in perpetrating a robbery was murder.

The legislature did not intend that this species of killing should be murder of the first degree only when accompanied by a deliberate, premeditated design to kill; for if such a design had been a necessary ingredient to constitute murder of the first degree, the latter part of section 1st would not have been added.

If killing in the perpetration of a robbery was murder of the first degree only when accompanied with such a design, it was already included under the words "other deliberate and premeditated killing," and nothing further need have been said about it.

Section 1st, as construed by respondent, would read substantially thus: "All murder committed by deliberate and premeditated killing, or committed by deliberate and premeditated killing in perpetrating robbery, is murder of the first degree." We think the meaning of the section better expressed by the following reading: "All kinds of unlawful killing which constituted murder at common law, if committed by poison, starving, torture, or other deliberate and premeditated killing, or if committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, constitute under this statute murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of unlawful killing which constituted murder at common law, constitute under this statute murder of the second degree."

II. Did the indictment charge murder by deliberate and premeditated killing, or in perpetrating robbery? If not, the instructions to the jury were erroneous.

The indictment is in the form prescribed by statute: Gen. Stat. ch. 242, sect. 14. This is the common-law form, and probably the only one used in this state, either before or since the statute dividing murder into two degrees. We presume that several persons have been executed in this state who were convicted of murder in the first degree under a similar indictment and upon similar instructions.

But notwithstanding these facts a plausible argument may be made in support of the position that this indictment does not charge murder by deliberate and premeditated killing, and that therefore proof of such killing will not justify a verdict of murder in the first degree under this indictment.

Prior to the statute of 23 Henry 8th all felonious homicides were of one sort. That statute made a distinction between homicides committed wilfully, "of malice prepensed," and those not so committed. The former are now designated by the term "murder," the latter by "manslaughter." The practice has been in charging manslaughter to allege the act to have been done "feloniously," or "wilfully and feloniously;" in charging murder to allege it to have been done "feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought." The words "malice aforethought," long ago acquired in law a settled meaning somewhat different from their popular signification. In their legal sense these words do not import an actual intention to kill the deceased. "Malice, although in its popular sense it means hatred, ill-will, or hostility to another, yet in its legal sense has a very different meaning," perhaps well expressed by the words, "a wrong motive of any kind;" it signifies "the wilful doing of an injurious act without lawful excuse." So "malice aforethought" "is not so properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil design in general; the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; *un disposition a faire un male chose*; and it may be either *express* or *implied* in law:" 4 Bl. Com. 198. It "does not mean premeditated personal hatred or revenge against the person killed; but it means that kind of unlawful purpose which, if persevered in, must produce mischief, such as if accompanied with those circum-

stances that show the heart to be perversely wicked, is adjudged to be proof of malice prepense." Lord DENMAN, C. J., in *Regina v. Tyler*, 8 C. & P. 616.

Within a comparatively recent period statutes have been enacted in this and other jurisdictions, similar to the statute now in force here, classifying certain kinds of murder under the head of "murder of the first degree," "and all other kinds under murder of the second degree;" there being a wide difference in the punishments provided by the statute for the two degrees.

The words "deliberate and premeditated killing," used in the statute, obviously mean something more than the expression "malice aforethought" construed in its legal signification; they import an intent to take the life of the deceased.

Since the passage of this statute can a respondent, indicted for murder "with malice aforethought," be convicted of murder in the first degree by proof of "deliberate and premeditated killing?"

On the one hand it is urged that the stream cannot rise higher than its fountain, the verdict cannot go beyond the indictment; that, as in an action of debt the plaintiff shall not recover more than the demand laid in the declaration, nor have judgment even for that demand unless his declaration alleges such facts and circumstances as show him entitled to it, so in criminal cases the state cannot ask the jury to find the respondent guilty of an offence with which he has not been charged; that every circumstance which affects the punishment as provided by law must be alleged in the indictment; that, when a statute prescribes a punishment for larceny of property of the value of twenty dollars, more severe than that prescribed for larceny of property under that value (see Gen. Stat. ch. 260, sects. 3-5), the jury cannot upon the trial of an indictment alleging larceny of property of the value of fifteen dollars find the respondent guilty of stealing property of the value of twenty-five dollars, or, if they do, the court can only inflict the sentence prescribed for stealing less than twenty dollars in value; that, although formerly the premeditation did not affect the punishment, and therefore need not have been alleged, yet, if it *now* affects it, the indictment must allege it, else the jury cannot find it; that whether the two degrees of murder are, technically speaking, distinct and different crimes or not, yet practically there is a wider gulf between them, so far as the punishment is concerned, than between any other two kindred offences known to the law, the difference being that between life and death.

On the other hand it is urged that the statute creates no new offence; that murder of the first and murder of the second degree are not two distinct crimes, the statute merely dividing murder into two degrees; that the punishment for the higher grade of the crime is not changed; that all which the statute does is to provide the milder punishment of imprisonment for murder of the second degree, *all* murder having before been punishable by death; that the statute only specifies certain things, which, if found by the jury, shall require them to bring in a verdict subjecting the prisoner to death; while, if they are not so found, the verdict shall be one authorizing imprisonment merely.

The numerical weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the latter view. It is sustained by decisions in Maine (*State v. Verrill*, 54 Me. 408); in Pennsylvania (*Commonwealth v. Flanagan*, 7 W. & S. 415);

in Massachusetts (*Green v. Commonwealth*, 12 Allen 155); in Texas (*Gehrke v. State*, 13 Texas 568); in Virginia (1 Va. Cases 310, 2 Id. 387, 14 Grattan 592); and in California (*People v. Murray*, 10 Cal 309); also by decisions of a majority of the court in New York (*Fitzgerald v. People*, 37 N. Y. 413, 685); and in Tennessee (*Mitchell v. State*, 8 Yerger 514); and the same doctrine is reaffirmed in New York in *Kennedy v. The People*, 39 N. Y. 245.

On the opposite side are the decision in *State v. Jones*, 20 Mo. 59 (based in great degree upon the practice in that state), and the decision in *Fonts v. State*, 4 G. Greene (Iowa) 500, which has been seriously questioned, if not overruled, in the subsequent case of *State v. Johnson*, 8 Iowa 525. There are also the dissenting opinions of PECK, J., 8 Yerger 534, and BACON, J., 37 N. Y. 685.

Wharton, in his *American Criminal Law*, and in his work on *Homicide*, lays down the rule contended for by the state, but without any discussion. See 1 Whart. Am. Crim. Law, sect. 1115.

Bishop, in his work on *Criminal Procedure*, discusses the question elaborately, and argues strongly in favor of the opposite view: 2 Bishop on *Criminal Procedure*, 1st ed., sects. 562-597; Bishop's *First Book of the Law*, sect. 401.

It may be questionable whether section 14 of chap. 242, Gen. Stat., prescribing the form of indictment for murder, can avail the state on this point. That statute does not provide that the words "malice aforethought," when used in indictments for murder, shall be construed according to their popular meaning. In the absence of such a proviso, these words, having acquired a definite meaning at common law, must be understood as having this common-law meaning affixed to them when used in the statute, although such legal meaning may differ from their literal sense, or from their meaning when used in common conversation. See *Mayo v. Wilson*, 1 N. H. 53, p. 55; *Thurber v. Blackbourne*, 1d. 242, p. 245.

If, then, these words do not, in their legal meaning, imply a deliberate and premeditated design to kill, can they be construed as sufficiently charging such a design, merely because the legislature has authorized their use in their legal meaning?

And, if they do not charge that offence, can the legislature authorize a conviction for that offence under this form of indictment? The accused has a constitutional right to have the offence plainly and substantially described in the indictment. See 1 Bishop on *Criminal Procedure*, 1st ed., sects. 403-406.

A majority of the court think that, under, this indictment, the respondent can be convicted of murder in the first degree upon proof that he murdered Brown by deliberate and premeditated killing; I am unable to assent to this view; and I am authorized to say that Judge DOE does not concur in the opinion of the majority on this point.

Under this indictment, the respondent can be convicted of murder in the first degree upon proof of murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery. The words "malice aforethought," in their legal sense, well describe the motive necessary to be proved in such a case, which, as we have just held, does not involve the idea of a deliberate and premeditated design to kill the deceased.

III. The constitutionality of the statute allowing the state two per-



empty challenges has just been affirmed in *State v. Wilson*, 48 N. H. 398; see also *Commonwealth v. Dorsey*, 103 Mass. 412.

The order in which the parties shall exercise the right of challenge is within the discretion of the court at the trial term, and their ruling on this point is not matter for exception. See *DOE, J.*, in *Boardman v. Woodman*, 47 N. H. 120, p. 144.

IV. The question whether Tenney was "indifferent" was one of fact to be decided by the court at the trial. See *Rollins v. Ames*, 2 N. H. 350; *State v. Howard*, 17 Id. 171, p. 191-2; *March v. Portsmouth and Concord Railroad*, 19 Id. 372; the court are "the triers" of this question; and their decision stands, like the verdict of a jury, to be reversed only when it is manifestly against law and evidence. Such ground for reversal does not exist in this case. The decision seems correct. Without attempting to review or reconcile the numerous cases on this topic (see 1 Bishop Crim. Procedure, sect. 771, note; 2 Whart. Am. Crim. Law, sects. 2976-3016), it is sufficient to say that we adopt the views expressed by *SHAW, C. J.*, in *Commonwealth v. Webster*, 5 Cush. 295, p. 297-8: "The statute intended to exclude any person who had made up his mind, or formed a judgment in advance, in favor of either side. Yet, the opinion or judgment must be something more than a vague impression, formed from casual conversation with others, or from reading imperfect, abbreviated newspaper reports. It must be such an opinion upon the merits of the question as would be likely to bias or prevent a candid judgment upon a full hearing of the evidence. If one had formed what in some sense might have been called an opinion, but which yet fell far short of exciting any bias or prejudice, he might conscientiously discharge his duty as a juror." See also *PARKER, C. J.*, in *State v. Howard*, 17 N. H. 171, p. 194-5.

V. Whether the confession by the respondent to Leavitt was made in consequence of inducement held out by Leavitt, was a question of fact to be decided by the judges who presided at the trial; and their finding upon this question is a finality as much as the verdict of a jury upon a question of fact. See *State v. Squires*, 48 N. H. 364. The respondent has, therefore, no ground of exception to the admission of the confession.

VI. The evidence as to intoxication was not objectionable: *People v. Eastwood*, 14 N. Y. 562, and *Gahagan v. Boston and Lowell Railroad Co.*, 1 Allen 187, directly sustain the ruling; see also *Whittier v. Franklin*, 46 N. H. 23, and cases there cited; *State v. Shinborn*, 46 Id. 497. Intoxication is a fact open to the observation of every man, and no "special skill or learning" is requisite to discern it.

VII. A majority of the court are not disposed to overrule the very recent decision in *Boardman v. Woodman*, 47 N. H. 120, that witnesses who are not experts cannot give their opinions on the question of sanity.

Under this view of the law, the reasons which induced witnesses to leave the respondent were properly excluded. Probably the practical result of a contrary ruling would be to allow the witnesses to give their opinions on sanity. They were allowed to describe the respondent's appearance, and his and their conduct. It was for the jury to say what inferences should be drawn from the facts described. A similar exception was overruled in *Boardman v. Woodman*, 47 N. H. 120; see p. 121.

VIII. The court instructed the jury "that whether there is such a mental disease as dipsomania, and whether defendant had that disease,

and whether the killing of Brown was the product of such disease, were questions of fact for the jury."

This was correct. If there are any diseases whose existence is so much a matter of history and general knowledge that the court may properly assume it in charging a jury, dipsomania certainly does not fall within that class. The court do not profess to have the qualifications of medical experts. Whether there is such a disease as dipsomania is a question of science and fact, not of law.

IX. Whether the presumption of sanity is one of law or fact (a point on which contradictory views have been expressed in recent cases in this state (see *BELL*, C. J., in *Perkins v. Perkins*, 39 N. H. 163, p. 170, 171; *BELLOWS*, J., in *State v. Bartlett*, 43 Id. 224, p. 230; instructions to jury by *BARTLETT*, J., in *Boardman v. Woodman*, 47 Id. 120, p. 123), or a mixed presumption of law and fact (see *Sutton v. Sadler*, 3 C. B. N. S. 87), is in many cases "a question merely verbal—a question of the propriety of certain forms of expression."

If it be merely a presumption of fact, it is, nevertheless, a presumption drawn from the common experience of mankind, which the court were well warranted in calling the attention of the jury to; and it is a presumption which the jury would inevitably have made whether the court had referred to it or not. For these reasons we think the refusal to charge "that there is no legal presumption which can have any weight with the jury as matter of law," could not have materially prejudiced the respondent.

The court also declined to instruct the jury "that there is no legal presumption of sanity which is a substitute for evidence."

We think that the presumption of sanity, whether it be a presumption of law or of fact, is, in one sense, "a substitute for evidence." The general presumption of sanity is sufficient *prima facie* evidence of that fact to warrant a finding of sanity where no evidence is introduced tending to show insanity.

The other instructions requested on this point (see *State v. Bartlett*, 43 N. H. 224) were substantially included in the instructions given.

Exceptions overruled.

DOE, J.—Witnesses, not experts, called by the defendant, were not allowed to testify that, from their observations of his appearance and conduct before the alleged murder, they formed the opinion that he was insane. This testimony should have been received.

In England no express decision of the point can be found, for the reason that such evidence has always been admitted without objection. It has been universally regarded as so clearly competent that it seems no English lawyer has ever presented to any court any objection, question, or doubt in regard to it. But in *Wright v. Tatham*, 5 Cl. & Fin. 670, s. c. 4 Bing. N. C. 489, the question was involved in such a manner, and the number and strength of the judicial opinions were such, as to make that case an authority of the greatest weight in favor of the competency of the evidence.

In addition to that case and the other English authorities cited in *Boardman v. Woodman*, 47 N. H. 144, are *Lowe v. Jolliffe*, 1 W. Bl. 365; *Attorney-General v. Parnter*, 3 Br. C. C. 441, 442; *King v. Arnold*, 16 St. Tr. 695, 706, 707, 708, 710, 711, 712, 713, 715, 717,

719, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 730, 732, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 742, 746, 747, 748, 750, 751, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763; *King v. Ferrers*, 19 St. Tr. 885, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 952, 953; *King v. Frith*, 22 St. Tr. 307, 313, 314, 315, 317; *King v. Hadfield*, 27 St. Tr. 1281, 1299, 1301, 1304, 1305, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1337, 1347, 1350, 1353; *King v. Bellingham*, Annual Register 1812, part 2, pp. 304, 307; *King v. Bowler*, Ann. Reg. 1812, part 2, pp. 309, 310; *King v. Offord*, Ann. Reg. 1831, part 2, pp. 107, 108; *Queen v. Oxford*, 9 C. & P. 525, 317, 318; s. c. in Ann. Reg. 1840, part 2, pp. 249, 257, 259; s. c. in 1 Townsend Modern State Trials 102, 125, 132, 133, 134, 135; *Queen v. Higginson*, 1 C. & K. 129, 130; *Queen v. McNaughten*, Ann. Reg. 1843, part 2, pp. 345, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357; s. c. in 1 Townsend Mod. St. Tr. 314, 347, 348, 349, 384, 385, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392; *Queen v. Dove*, J. F. Stephen Cr. Law 391, 394, 395; 396; *Queen v. Mitchell*, Ann. Reg. 1863, part 2, pp. 157, 159; *Queen v. Townley*, Ann. Reg. 1863, part 2, pp. 296, 302, 304; *Queen v. Baker*, Ann. Reg. 1867, part 2, pp. 217, 224.

The number of English authorities is limited only by the number of fully reported cases in which the question of sanity has been raised.

The uniform rule in England, from the earliest times to the present, may be wrong; but on a common-law subject like this, it is entitled to consideration. It should be set aside, and a new rule should be established if it can be clearly shown that all the authorities of the native land of the common law have been erroneous from the beginning, and in conflict with the principles of the common law, or that they are not applicable to our institutions or the circumstances of this country. But whoever asserts that such a condition exists, has the task of maintaining the assertion; and that task on this question has never been performed.

In this country the authorities are almost equally unanimous in favor of the competency of the evidence: *Lester v. Pittsford*, 7 Vt. 158; *Morse v. Crawford*, 17 Id. 499; *Clifford v. Richardson*, 18 Id. 620, 627; *Cram v. Cram*, 33 Id. 15; *Crane v. Northfield*, Id. 124; *Cavendish v. Troy*, 41 Id. 99, 108; *Grant v. Thompson*, 4 Conn. 203; *Kinne v. Kinne*, 9 Id. 102; *Dunham's Appeal*, 27 Id. 192; *Swift's Ev.* 111; *Stewart v. Lisenard*, 26 Wend. 291, 308, 309; *Culver v. Haslam*, 7 Barb. 314; *De Witt v. Barley*, 13 Id. 550; s. c. 9 N. Y. 371; s. c. 17 Id. 340; *Delafield v. Parish*, 25 Id. 37, 38; *Clapp v. Fullerton*, 34 Id. 190; *Clark v. Sawyer*, 3 Sandf. Ch. 357; *Den v. Gibbons*, 2 Zab. 117, 135, 136; *Whitenack v. Stryker*, 1 Green Ch. 8; *Sloan v. Maxwell*, 2 Id. 563, 583, 584, 586, 588, 592, 594, 599, 602; *In the matter of Vanauken*, 2 Stock. Ch. 192; *Turner v. Cheesman*, 15 N. J. Ch. 243; *Garrison v. Garrison*, Id. 266; *Rambler v. Tyron*, 7 S. & R. 90, 92; *Irish v. Smith*, 8 Id. 573, 576; *Wogan v. Small*, 11 Id. 141, 144; *Grabill v. Barr*, 5 Penna. St. 441, 443; *Wilkinson v. Pearson*, 23 Id. 117, 120; *Bricker v. Lightner*, 40 Id. 199; *Duffield v. Morris*, 2 Haring. (Del.) 375, 377, 385; *Brooke v. Townsend*, 7 Gill 1028; *Stewart v. Redditt*, 3 Md. 67, 78; *Stewart v. Spedden*, 5 Id. 433, 446; *Dorsey v. Warfield*, 7 Id. 65, 73; *Weems v. Weems*, 19 Id. 334, 345; *Temple v. Tayler*, 1 Hen. & Munf. 476, 478; *Burton v. Scott*, 3 Rand. 399, 403, 404, 405; *Mercer v. Kelso*, 4 Grat. 106, 118; *Clary v. Clary*, 2

Ired. 78; *Heyward v. Hazard*, 1 Bay 335, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344; *Griffin v. Griffin*, R. M. Charlt. 217, 218, 220, 221, 223; *Potts v. House*, 6 Ga. 324; *Berry v. State*, 10 Id. 510, 529; *Walker v. Walker*, 14 Id. 242, 151; *Roberts v. Trawick*, 13 Ala. 68, 84; *Norris v. State*, 16 Id. 776; *Florey v. Florey*, 24 Id. 241, 247; *Powell v. State*, 25 Id. 21; *Stubbs v. Houston*, 33 Id. 355, 564; *In re Carmichael*, 36 Id. 514, 522; *Gibson v. Gibson*, 9 Yerg. 329; *Baldwin v. State*, 12 Mo. 223; *Farrell v. Brennan*, 32 Id. 328; *Kelly v. McGuire*, 15 Ark. 555, 601; *Abraham v. Wilkins*, 17 Ark. 292, 322; *State v. Gardner*, Wright 392, 398; *Clark v. State*, 12 Ohio 483, 490; *Doe v. Reagan*, 5 Blackf. 217; *Roe v. Taylor*, 45 Ill. 485; *Pelamourges v. Clark*, 9 Iowa 1, 11-19, 29; *State v. Felter*, 25 Id. 67; *White v. Bailey*, 10 Mich. 155, 161; *Beaubien v. Cicotte*, 12 Mich. 459, 495-508; *Case of Lawrence*, tried in the District of Columbia, before Judge Cranch and two other judges, for shooting at President Jackson, 48 Niles Reg. 119; *Hoge v. Fisher*, Pet. C. C. 163, 165; *Harrison v. Rowan*, 3 Wash. C. C. 580, 582, 586.

On the other side there are authorities in Maine, Massachusetts, and Texas, which hold a contrary doctrine; but, on examination, they are found to occupy very feeble positions.

So far as the history of the law, on this subject, has been brought to the notice of this court, the first time the competency of this evidence was doubted, was in the jury trial of a probate case at Cambridge, Mass., in 1807. The only account we have of that affair, is the report of Mr. Tyng, who says, that the court permitted the subscribing witnesses to the will to give their opinions of the sanity of the testator, and that, "other witnesses were allowed to testify to the appearance of the testator, and to any particular facts from which the state of his mind might be inferred, but not to testify merely their opinion or judgment." *Poole v. Richardson*, 3 Mass. 330. From the conspicuous and emphatic use of the word "merely," and from what occurred in subsequent Massachusetts cases, there is reason to suspect that the only point ruled in this case, was, that the witnesses were allowed to give their opinions when they stated the particular facts from which the state of the testator's mind was inferred by them, "but not to testify merely their opinion or judgment." They "were allowed to testify to the appearance of the testator;" and they could not do that without giving their opinions. It was a ruling made hastily and probably instantaneously, without argument, during a trial before a jury, at a time when the hurry of clearing the crowded dockets of Massachusetts, gave no opportunity for deliberation.

If the court had been aware that this ruling overturned all the authorities and the uniform practice of England and America from the beginning of the common law to that day, it is not to be presumed that the ruling would have been made without a formal opinion reduced to writing by some member of the court, formally delivered, and formally reported, giving some reason for the innovation. If they had been conscious of the novel and revolutionary character of the precedent, they would not have introduced it so summarily and inconsiderately.

This was not the only mistake made at Nisi Prius. In the previous month, in the trial of another probate case, when the only issue was upon the sanity of a testator, and the formal execution of the will was

therefore not in question, the court refused to allow two of the subscribing witnesses of the will to testify because the third witness was not produced : *Chase v. Lincoln*, 3 Mass. 236. Nor are these the only peculiarities in the precedents of that state. At the trial of another probate case, the physicians who attended the testatrix in her last sickness were asked whether, in their opinion, she was sane. Objection was made to the competency of any opinion. The court ruled that the attending physicians might give their opinions, but state the particular circumstances or symptoms from which they drew their conclusions : *Hathorn v. King*, 8 Mass. 371. And in *Dickinson v. Barber*, 9 Id. 225, it was held on that ground, that certain depositions of physicians had been rightly excluded. In *Commonwealth v. Rich*, 14 Gray 335, 337, it was held, as matter of law, that a physician of thirty years' practice, who had testified that he had made the subject of mental disease a study, but not a special study, and had had the usual experience of practicing physicians on the subject, could not be questioned upon a hypothetical case stated in the usual manner. These cases show a peculiar and exceptional system of practice on these subjects, which has never prevailed in this state.

In *Buckminster v. Perry*, 4 Mass. 593, "two or three witnesses were of opinion that the testator was much broken and very forgetful about the time the will was made." Instead of rejecting this evidence, the court charged the jury "that the evidence given by the appellants to invalidate the will deserved but little consideration." In *Needham v. Ide*, 5 Pick. 510, the jury were instructed that the "*mere opinions* of other witnesses" than those who subscribed the will, "were not competent evidence, and were not entitled to *any weight*, further than they were supported by the facts and circumstances proved on the trial." These witnesses gave their opinions, "without being asked;" objection was not made to their opinions; their opinions were not rejected at the time they were given, nor absolutely excluded from the consideration of the jury by the charge of the court. But in *Commonwealth v. Wilson*, 1 Gray 337, 339; at Nisi Prius, in *Hubbell v. Bissell*, 2 Allen 196, 200, by a *dictum*; and in *Commonwealth v. Fairbanks*, Id. 511, in a *per curiam* decision, it was held that the incompetency of the opinions of non-experts was not an open question in Massachusetts. The court merely refused to investigate the question. In this abrupt and unsatisfactory manner, without any consideration from first to last, has this exception become established in that state. Of the four judges reported as present at the October Term 1807, at Cambridge, we do not know who were present at the trial of *Poole v. Richardson*. The next year, at Cambridge, when Ch. J. PARSONS charged the jury in *Buckminster v. Perry*, witnesses were allowed to testify that, in their opinion, "the testator was much broken and very forgetful;" and this evidence was not excluded from the consideration of the jury. In *Needham v. Ide* no opinion of the court is reported; but the reporter says that the court overruled an objection taken to the instruction given to the jury that the mere opinions "were not entitled to any weight further than they were supported by the facts and circumstances proved on the trial." After that, at Nisi Prius, and in a *dictum*, and in a *per curiam* decision, the court held themselves concluded by their own precedents.

The only judge in Massachusetts who appears to have deliberated on

the subject, gave his judgment against the peculiar practice of that state. In *Baxter v. Abbott*, 7 Gray 71, 79, Judge THOMAS says: "All lawyers know how difficult it is to try issues of sanity with the restrictions as to matters of opinion already existing; how hard it is to make witnesses distinguish between matters of fact and opinion on this subject; between the conduct and traits of character they observe and the impression which that conduct and those traits create, or the mental conclusion to which they lead the mind of the observer. If it were a new question I should be disposed to allow every witness to give his opinion subject to cross-examination, upon the reasons upon which it is based, his degree of intelligence and his means of observation."

The counties of Massachusetts which became the state of Maine thirteen years after the exception was introduced in *Poole v. Richardson*, did not abandon their practice on that point, as they did not abandon the general system of practice which had grown up with them while they were a part of Massachusetts. For thirteen years the exception had the same authority, and was administered by the same court in Essex and in York. As it was never examined in Massachusetts on the south, so it has never been examined in Massachusetts on the east: *Ware v. Ware*, 8 Greenlf. 42, 54, 55, 56; *Wyman v. Gould*, 47 Me. 159. It is equally regarded in both as an inherited peculiarity for which no one is responsible. Its position as an authority was not materially strengthened by the division of the state.

In *Gehrke v. State*, 13 Texas 568, it was summarily held, without any citation of authority or consideration of principle, that it would have been improper to receive as evidence the vague, indefinite expression of a witness that the prisoner looked like or acted as an insane person.

Thus stand the precedents of other jurisdictions at present, so far as they have been brought to the notice of this court; Massachusetts, Maine, and Texas on one side, the rest on the other; and no attempt in either of the three states to justify their peculiar exception. If this amounts to a conflict among the authorities it must be regarded as inconsiderable.

In many of the cases in which the opinions of ordinary witnesses have been received the question has been fully considered, and their competency established on solid ground. "Testimony of opinion may be given where, from the general and indefinite nature of the inquiry, it is not susceptible of direct proof. Thus upon a question of insanity witnesses, not professional men, may be permitted to give their opinion in connection with the facts observed by them. But this evidence is always confined to those who have observed the facts, and is never permitted where the opinion of the witness is derived from the representation of others. Upon a question of insanity, for instance, witnesses who have observed the conduct of the patient, and been acquainted with his conversation, may testify to his acts and sayings, and give the result of their observation; but where mere opinion is required upon a given state of facts, that opinion is to be derived from professional men:" *Lester v. Pittsford*, 7 Vt. 158, 161. "The law is well settled, and especially in this state, that a witness may give his opinion in evidence in connection with the facts upon which it is founded, and as derived from them, though he could not be allowed to give his opinion founded

upon facts proved by other witnesses :” *Morse v. Crawford*, 17 Vt. 499, 502. “Where mere opinion is required upon a given state of facts not connected with the personal observation of the witness, that opinion is to be received from professional men alone :” *Cram v. Cram*, 33 Vt. 15, 18. These extracts are a sufficient answer to the objection made against some of the authorities that they require the witness to state facts as well as opinion. The objection is as invalid as it would be if made against the admission of opinions as to physical health. A witness cannot testify that in his opinion the defendant was sick or well, without first showing that he had an opportunity of forming an opinion from facts observed by himself. If a witness, not an expert, is first asked whether, in his opinion, A. was sane or insane at a certain time, the witness would not be allowed to answer the question. It must first appear that his opinion is formed upon his own observations and not upon the testimony of other witnesses, or upon hearsay, or upon a hypothetical case. If his opinion is formed upon the testimony of other witnesses the jury have as good an opportunity as the witness to form an opinion ; if it is formed upon hearsay it is mere indirect proof of hearsay ; of a hypothetical case the jury can form an opinion as well as a non-expert witness. But if the opinion of the witness is formed upon his own observations he had a better opportunity to form an opinion than the jury can have from a description of the acts and words of the person whose sanity is in question ; because such a description cannot generally convey any adequate idea of the signs of sanity or insanity as they appear to an observer. It is necessary as far as possible that the impression produced by the acts and words should be conveyed to the jury, and it cannot generally be conveyed by a mere description or recital of them ; therefore the opinions of observers constitute one of the classes of testimony known in law as the best evidence ; not the best because it happens to be the only available evidence in a particular case, but the best because it belongs to one of the best species of evidence usually available—the best in the nature of things—the best by reason of “the general and indefinite nature of the inquiry, and the difficulty of producing direct proof of a mere mental condition :” *Crane v. Northfield*, 33 Vt. 124, 125. “The best testimony the nature of the case admits of ought to be adduced ; and on the subject of insanity, in my judgment, it consists in the representation of facts, and of the impressions which they made :” *Grant v. Thompson*, 4 Conn. 203.

“The judgment which we form as to the mental condition of an acquaintance depends as much upon his looks and gestures, connected with his conversation and conduct, as upon the words and actions themselves, and yet it would be a hopeless task for the most gifted person to clothe in language all the minute particulars with their necessary accompaniments and qualifications which have led to the conclusion which he has formed :” DENIO, J., in *De Witt v. Barley*, 9 N. Y. 371, 389, 390. No mere description of the wrinkles of the face, of the tone of the voice, or the color of the hair, would be likely to convey any very accurate impression as to the precise age of the person described. The case of *McKee v. Nelson*, 4 Cow. 355, is an example belonging to the same class. That was an action for breach of promise of marriage, and a witness who knew the plaintiff, and had observed her conduct and deportment toward the defendant, was permitted to testify whether in

her opinion the plaintiff was sincerely attached to him—a fact which it is plain could be proved in no other way. *Trelawney v. Coleman*, 2 Stark. 191, is another case of the same kind. There in an action for criminal conversation a witness who was acquainted with the parties was permitted to give her opinion as to the degree of affection entertained by the wife for her husband. \* \* \* To me it seems a plain proposition that upon inquiries as to mental imbecility arising from age, it will be found impracticable in many cases to come to a satisfactory conclusion without receiving to some extent the opinions of witnesses. How is it possible to describe in words, that combination of minute appearances upon which a judgment in such cases is formed? The attempt to try such a question excluding all matter of opinion would, in most cases, I am persuaded, prove entirely futile. \* \* \* A witness can scarcely convey any intelligible idea upon such a question without infusing into his testimony more or less of opinion. Mental imbecility is exhibited in part by attitude, by gesture, by the tones of the voice, and the expression of the eye and the face. Can these be described in language so as to convey to one not an eye-witness an adequate conception of their force? \* \* \* It certainly strikes me that few questions can be suggested, about which it is possible to raise a doubt, which are more conclusively settled by authority than that under consideration. \* \* \* This court itself, since the former decision in this case, has, upon a question strictly analogous, unanimously established a different rule. I refer to the case of *The People v. Eastwood*, 14 N. Y. 562. Upon the trial of that case a witness was asked whether at the time of the homicide the prisoner was intoxicated? This question was objected to and excluded upon the ground that it called for the opinion of the witness. Exception was taken to this ruling, and upon that exception the case was brought to this court, where it was unanimously held that the evidence ought to have been received, and a new trial was granted for that among other reasons. The admissibility of the evidence was there placed upon the precise ground which has been assumed here, viz., that the appearances which indicate intoxication cannot be so perfectly described in words as to enable persons not eye-witnesses to judge with accuracy on the subject. The questions in that case and in this are in principle identical, and opinions cannot be held inadmissible in the present case without virtually overruling that of *Eastwood*.” *De Witt v. Barley*, 17 N. Y. 340, 344, 348, 350, 352.

“A witness may state facts, may give the look of the eye, and the action of the man, but unless he is permitted to express an opinion, he cannot convey to the mind distinctly the condition of the man that such acts and looks portray.” *In the matter of Vanauken*, 2 Stock. Ch. 186, 192. How can a witness “give the look of the eye” without giving an opinion? “The opinion of a witness as to the sanity of a person depends for its weight, on the capacity of the witness to judge, and his opportunity.” *Burton v. Scott*, 3 Rand. 399, 403. “And so it is in regard to questions respecting the temper in which words have been spoken, or acts done. Were they said or done kindly or rudely—in good humor or in anger; in jest or in earnest? What answer can be given to these inquiries if the observer is not permitted to state his impression or belief? Must a *fac simile* be attempted so as to bring before the jury the very tone, look, gestures, and manner, and let them collect



thereupon the disposition of the speaker or agent? \* \* \* Unquestionably before a witness can be received to testify as to the fact of capacity, it must appear that he had an adequate opportunity of observing and judging of capacity. But so different are the powers and the habits of observation in different persons, that no general rule can be laid down as to what shall be deemed a sufficient opportunity of observation, other than it has in fact enabled the observer to form a belief or judgment thereupon. So it is in the analogous case of handwriting. If a witness declares that he has seen the party write, whether it has been once only or a thousand times, this is enough to introduce the inquiry, whether he believes the paper produced to be the party's handwriting. His belief is evidence, the weight of which must depend upon a consideration of all the circumstances under which it was formed:" *Clary v. Clary*, 2 Ired. 78. Judge REDFIELD says of the decisions in *Clary v. Clary*, "The learned judge shows with great ability and abundant success, in our judgment, that the rule here adopted, is the only one consistent with principle": 1 Redfield on Wills 143, n. 16.

"A careful daily observer of a person feigning madness, would witness innumerable acts, motions and expressions of countenance, which, with the attending incidents and circumstances, would conclusively satisfy him of the fictitious character of the pretended malady, but which he could never communicate to a jury or scientific man, so as to give them a fair conception of their real importance. From poverty of language, these facts, should a witness attempt to detail them, would necessarily be mixed up with opinions general or partial, in spite of his best efforts to avoid it. There are things well known to all persons, which our language only enables us to express by words of comparison—such are the peculiar features of the face indicating an excitement of the passions, affections and emotions of the mind, as hope, fear, love, hatred, pleasure, pain, &c. Testimony affirming the existence or absence of either of these, is but a matter of opinion. So the statement of the fact that a man's whole conduct is natural, is but the opinion of the witness, formed by comparing the particular conduct spoken of, with the acts of the past life of the individual. It would hardly be claimed that such evidence should be excluded, yet it is equivalent to an opinion that the person is sane:" *Clark v. State*, 12 Ohio 483, 490. It must appear that "the facts upon which it is based, have come under his own observation:" *Doe v. Reagan*, 5 Blackf. 217. The subject is fully considered in *Beaubien v. Cicotte*, 12 Mich. 459, 495-508, and other cases.

Objection has been made to some of the cases in which it has been said that mere opinions were slight evidence. This has been said in some chancery cases, in which the judge passing upon fact as well as law, has expressed his opinion of the weight of certain testimony as a matter of fact within his power to decide. In other cases tried by jury, judges have expressed their opinions of the weight of this evidence as they were accustomed to express their opinions of the weight of other evidence. The practice, having been firmly fixed and universal, has often been as visible in the decisions of the court as in summing up the evidence to the jury. It embraces all evidence alike, and has no bearing upon the competency of particular testimony, which is the point now before us. The practice is obsolete in this state, but it is settled by authority that, at common law, the judge may give the jury his opinion

of the weight of any part or of the whole of the evidence—with this limitation, that he is not to give such opinion as imperative upon the jury—they are to understand that they are the judges of the facts: 2 Hale's Hist. Com. L. 147; *King v. Fisher*, 1 St. Tr. 395, 402; *King v. Cullender et al.*, 6 St. Tr. 687, 700; *King v. Keach*, 6 St. Tr. 701, 706, 709; *King v. Green et al.*, 7 St. Tr. 159, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219; *King v. Colledge*, 8 St. Tr. 550, 713, 726; *King v. Hordy*, 24 St. Tr. 1362, 1363, 1383; *Brembridge v. Osborne*, 1 Stark. 374; *Petty v. Anderson*, 3 Bing. 170, 171, 172, 173; *Solarte v. Melville*, 7 B. & C. 430, 435; *Davidson v. Stanley*, 2 M. & G. 221; *Calmady v. Rowe*, 6 M. G. & S. 861, 893; *Doe v. Strickland*, 8 Id. 743; *Pennell v. Dawson*, 18 Com. B. 355, 370; s. c. 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 431, 440; *Attorney-General v. Good*, McClel. & Y. 286; *Sutton v. Sadler*, 3 Com. B. (N. S.) 87, 98, 101, 103; *Queen v. Townley*, Ann. Reg. 1863, part 2, pp. 306–309; *Duberly v. Gunning*, 4 T. R. 651, 652; *Tyrwhitt v. Wynne*, 3 B. & Ald. 556, 560, 561; *Rex v. Burdett*, 4 Id. 131, 167; 1 Am. L. Rev. 59; *Carver v. Jackson*, 4 Pet. 1, 80; *Garrard v. Reynolds*, 4 How. (U. S.) 123; *Harrison v. Rowan*, 3 Wash. C. C. 580; *Phillips v. Kingfield*, 19 Me. 375; *Cunningham v. Batchelder*, 32 Id. 316; *Nutting v. Herbert*, 37 N. H. 346, 355; *Buckminster v. Perry*, 4 Mass. 593, 594; *Commonwealth v. Child*, 10 Pick. 252, 256; *Curl v. Lowell*, 19 Id. 25; *Davis v. Jenney*, 1 Met. 221; *Whiton v. O. C. I. Co.*, 2 Id. 1; *Eddy v. Gray*, 4 Allen 435; *State v. Lynott*, 5 R. I. 295; *F. B. Church v. Rouse*, 21 Conn. 160, 167; *N. Y. F. I. Co. v. Walden*, 12 Johns. 513; *Gardner v. Pickett*, 19 Wend. 186; *Lansing v. Russell*, 13 Barb. 521; *Hunt v. Bennett*, 4 E. D. Smith 647; *Bulkeley v. Ketellas*, 4 Sandf. 450; *Grove v. Donaldson*, 15 Penna. 128; *Oyster v. Longnecker*, 16 Id. 269; *Stoddard v. McIlwain*, 7 Rich. 525; *Still v. Glass*, 1 Ga. 475.

What was the New Hampshire rule as to the competency of the evidence, before the decision of *Boardman v. Woodman*?

In May 1811, *State v. George Ryan* was tried in Cheshire, before LIVERMORE, Ch. J., and STEELE, J. The Attorney-General appeared for the state, and Chamberlain, Hubbard and Vose for the defendant. The defence was insanity. Of non-expert witnesses called by the state, one testified that at the trial before the magistrate, the defendant “wished an adjournment of his examination—appeared to argue his motion for it like a man of understanding and discretion;” another testified that he “had no idea from what he saw of the defendant \* \* \* that he was any way deranged—the prisoner then appeared to have the full use of his reason;” another testified that the defendant “appeared to be perfectly in possession of his faculties \* \* \* no appearance of derangement.” Of non-expert witnesses called by the defendant, one testified that the defendant conducted on one occasion “like a man without sense;” another testified that in the morning of a certain day, the defendant “was perfectly rational—in the afternoon, became wild;” another confirmed the last; another testified that the defendant “appeared rational.” Non-expert witnesses gave their opinions freely without objection, and it is evident that the counsel and the court understood such evidence to be competent. Judge LIVERMORE, in summing up the testimony, particularly named the witnesses, who, to

use his own words, "testify that in their opinion he had not the use of his reason:" Pamp. Report of *State v. Ryan*.

In *State v. Farmer*, tried in 1821, before RICHARDSON, Ch. J., and WOODBURY and GREEN, JJ., a witness testified that the defendant had said he would kill the deceased. On cross-examination he was asked if he thought the defendant in earnest, and he answered in the negative without objection. The charge of the court shows that it was understood that this evidence was competent: Pamp. Report of *State v. Farmer*.

In October 1830, *State v. Corey* was tried in Cheshire, before RICHARDSON, Ch. J., and GREEN and HARRIS, JJ. Handerson, Wilson, and Chamberlain, the Solicitor, appeared for the state, and Woodbury, Hubbard, and Joel Parker for the defendant. The trial was reported by Joel Parker. The defence was insanity. The first witness called for the defence, was the defendant's brother, not an expert. He was asked if his father was sane. "The Solicitor objected to the question, and cited *Poole et al. v. Richardson*, 3 Mass. 330, and other authorities to show that the opinion of the witness could not be received in evidence." What the "other authorities" were, we know only from the fact that, at that time, there were no such authorities in the world outside of the original territory of the state of Massachusetts—the slight extension of the peculiar practice of Massachusetts beyond that territory, being a very recent affair. Notwithstanding the objection explicitly urged and supported by Massachusetts precedent, Corey's brother was allowed to testify "His father is crazy," and his sister "is wild as a hawk." At least six other non-expert witnesses testified to their opinions that various relatives of the defendant had been insane. One testified that the defendant was not insane at the time in question. One testified that the defendant looked and acted like a crazy person. The court asked one witness if the defendant, on a certain occasion, appeared rational; and received an affirmative answer. Many non-expert witnesses, on the part of the state, testified that they had known the defendant, and had never known of his being insane. One testified there "was one time when he saw him *out*—cannot say whether he had been drinking or not." Several testified that they had "never known of his being deranged except from liquor." We are informed by the reporter of the case that his report of the charge given to the jury by Judge RICHARDSON, was submitted to, and revised by, Judge RICHARDSON himself before publication. The charge shows that it was not doubted that the opinions were competent. Judge RICHARDSON expressly said that the opinions formed the day before the homicide, by persons in a situation which enabled them to judge, were "entitled to great weight."

Here was the first attempt made to introduce into this state, the Massachusetts exception, which was then twenty-three years old. The total failure of the attempt; the citation, consideration, and rejection of the Massachusetts cases; the admission of the opinions; the question put to one of the witnesses by the court; and the declaration of Judge RICHARDSON that the opinions formed the day before the homicide, were entitled to great weight, notwithstanding the Massachusetts authorities cited to show they were not admissible, render this a case of the very highest authority. To cite the Massachusetts cases as in conflict with *State v. Corey*, is, in this state, as unavailing as it would be to

cite *Gregg v. Wyman*, 4 Cush. 332, as in conflict with *Woodman v. Hubbard*, 25 N. H. 67, 76, 77, where *Gregg v. Wyman* was held not to be law. The cases in Maine, as we have seen, cannot be regarded as anything else than Massachusetts authority. And thus all existing precedents which have been cited from other jurisdictions as in conflict with *State v. Corey*, are disposed of, except the Texas case. As no authority was cited and no ground stated for the decision of the latter case, we could not be expected to follow it, and to overthrow the overwhelming mass of English and American authorities including those of our own state, without some urgent reason for so doing.

At the August term 1832, in Rockingham, held by Judge GREEN and Judge HARRIS, the case of *Hamblett v. Hamblett* was tried. The appellee "offered in evidence the deposition of Mary Palmer in which she testified, among other things, that on the day of the execution of the will, she was at the house of the testator, and that 'his discourse was satisfactory to her.' To this part of the testimony, the appellant objected. The evidence was admitted, but the court, in their instructions to the jury, directed them not to rely upon any evidence of opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the testator, except what was derived from the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the will." Questions raised at the trial were decided December 1833, when the court consisted of RICHARDSON, GREEN, PARKER, and UPHAM. Judge PARKER, delivering the opinion of the court, said that the whole force and effect of some of the evidence relating to certain persons was "to show their opinions that the testator was sane. \* \* \* It could be used only to show that they treated the will as valid and binding on them, and that the inference therefore was, that they were heretofore of opinion that the sanity of the testator could not be questioned. In this view, it would seem to stand upon the same ground as the matter which forms another objection on the part of the appellant, which is to the admission of the testimony of Mary Palmer that she had a conversation with the testator on the day of the execution of the will, and that 'his discourse was satisfactory to her.' This is wholly immaterial unless it be as evidence of the opinion of the witness that the testator was sane. But, the case finds that the judge expressly directed the jury not to rely upon any evidence of opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the testator, except what was derived from the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the will. On the supposition that this testimony of Mary Palmer to matter of opinion, or rather to matter from which her opinion of sanity is to be inferred, was incompetent—which is not conceded—if sufficiently connected with facts—the question arises whether this furnishes any ground for a new trial, the court having thus directed the jury."

After deciding that question, and holding that if the evidence had been incompetent, the exclusion of it after it had been received, would obviate the objection made to its admission, Judge PARKER said, "As to the direction of the judge, relative to evidence of opinion, it may be proper to remark that we do not intend to be understood as establishing this as the rule. The weight of authority seems to be in favor of admitting the opinions of others than the witnesses to the will, if connected with evidence of the facts upon which those opinions are founded: 3 Stark Ev. 1707 in notes; *Grante v. Thompson*, 4 Conn. 203; vide also *Hathorn v. King*, 8 Mass. 371; *Buckminster v. Perry*, 4 Id. 594;

*Lowe v. Jolliffe*, 2 W. Black. 365. It remains to be considered whenever the question shall directly arise whether this is not the most eligible and proper course in questions of this nature; but upon this matter it is not now necessary to make a decision": *Hamblett v. Hamblett*, 6 N. H. 333, 336, 344, 349. This is a strong intimation that the doctrine of *State v. Corey* had not been, and was not likely to be, abandoned.

In September 1834, *State v. Prescott* was tried in Merrimack, before Judge RICHARDSON and Judge PARKER. George Sullivan, Attorney-General, and John Whipple, Solicitor, appeared for the state; Ichabod Bartlett and Charles H. Peaslee for the defendant. The defence was insanity. A large number of non-expert witnesses testified to their opinions of the sanity or the insanity of the defendant and some of his relatives; and no objection was made to the competency of the opinions. The case was sharply and strenuously contested on each side; it was tried according to the strict rules of law as then understood; the distinguished counsel on both sides, insisted upon a rigid observance of those rules; they waived no objection that occurred to them; nothing was yielded to courtesy, convenience, or humanity; in no case tried in this state, since that time, has there been a greater display of zeal, acuteness, and power on the part of counsel. It is reasonably certain that if it had been supposed to be doubtful whether the opinions of non-experts were admissible, objection would have been made to them. Those opinions were argued by the counsel, and considered by the court and jury as evidence; and there is no reason to suspect that any one engaged in the trial, thought they were not evidence.

In addition to these precedents, we know, upon the most authentic information, that, down to the time when Judge PARKER left the bench in 1848, he did not understand that the early New Hampshire practice with which he had been familiar in *State v. Corey*, and *State v. Prescott*, and of which he had expressed his approval in *Hamblett v. Hamblett*, had been abolished, and the contrary Massachusetts practice established in its place. After the delivery and publication of his opinion in *Hamblett v. Hamblett*, it is not probable that he would assent to a silent reversal of the doctrine of *State v. Corey*, or allow it to be reversed without some reason for or against the innovation, being put on record.

This brings us down to a recent period. Whatever uncertainty there is, has arisen since Judge PARKER presided in this court. In 1848, when he retired from the bench and removed from the state, the decision in Texas had not been made, but the Massachusetts exception had been disapproved in *Hamblett v. Hamblett*, and rejected in *State v. Ryan*, *State v. Corey*, and *State v. Prescott*. Down to 1848 there is no doubt that the doctrine of *Poole v. Richardson* was not the law of this state. This is a matter as to which we have dates. The doctrine of *Poole v. Richardson* was not brought from England with the body of the common law; it was a ruling first made in this country in the present century; it had not gained a foothold in this state twenty-one years ago, and was never recognised in our decisions until 1865.

After Judge PARKER left the state, and before the trial of *Boardman v. Woodman*, the question of sanity was tried in a few cases, and so far as any practice can be said to have grown up in those few cases in those seventeen years, it grew into conformity to the Massachusetts exception. So far as it amounted to anything, it was a silent, unauthentic growth,

and it is very easily explained. No judge remained on the bench who had participated in the decision of *Hamblett v. Hamblett*, or in the trial of the early cases. The significant observations of Judge PARKER, in *Hamblett v. Hamblett*, were not kept prominently before the profession by any head-note or digest. They were enveloped in a case of eighteen pages, and in a part of it not likely to be often if ever read; they were entirely overlooked or forgotten. The pamphlet reports of *State v. Ryan*, *State v. Corey*, and *State v. Prescott* were scarce, seldom if ever read and substantially unknown; and the surviving counsel who had been engaged in those trials were no longer on active duty at our bar, and had no occasion to remonstrate against the change of our practice. The Massachusetts exception prevailed in the territory adjoining us on the south and east. The Massachusetts reports were used more than any others except our own. The legal treatises referring to this subject, in most common use among us, were written or edited by Massachusetts men who were not aware that the doctrine of *Poole v. Richardson* was a peculiarity of their state, and who stated the Massachusetts exception to be the common law, as they erroneously supposed it was. Greenleaf on Evidence and Massachusetts editions of Jarman on Wills exercised a potent influence in the introduction of that great mistake: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 440; 1 Jarman on Wills 77, Mass. ed. In the second and subsequent Massachusetts editions of Jarman, the third chapter of the first volume of the English edition was omitted, and a new chapter by the Massachusetts editor was inserted in its place. In the text of this new chapter the editor gives the peculiar local rule of *Poole v. Richardson*, as if it were common law. It was stated in the advertisement to the second edition that the editor had added this new chapter to the original text; but the authorship of this chapter was very likely to escape observation in the use generally made of the book.

There was one peculiarity in our practice which opened the way for the introduction of the Massachusetts exception. In 1826, when the court consisted of RICHARDSON, GREEN, and HARRIS, the case of *Rochester v. Chester*, 3 N. H. 349, was decided, in which Judge RICHARDSON, being an inhabitant of Chester, did not sit. It was there held that witnesses could not testify their opinions of the value of land. The decision of GREEN, J., and HARRIS, J., was reported. In *Peterboro' v. Jaffrey*, 6 N. H. 462, in which case Judge PARKER did not sit, the exception introduced in *Rochester v. Chester* was followed; it was then necessarily applied to sleds and all other property, and it continued in force (*Low v. Railroad*, 45 N. H. 370, 383) until its excessive inconvenience in practice could no longer be endured, and it was rescinded by the legislature: Gen. Stat. ch. 209, sect. 24. After Judge BELL came to the bench the court were never unanimous against restoring the common-law rule which admitted opinions of the value of property, but in accordance with the general usage, no dissent was publicly expressed.

The exception introduced by Judge GREEN and Judge HARRIS in *Rochester v. Chester* was peculiar to this state; it seems never to have prevailed anywhere else in the whole world: 1 Redfield on Wills 137, 3 c.; *Crane v. Northfield*, 33 Vt. 126; *Clark v. Baird*, 9 N. Y. 183; *De Witt v. Barley*, 17 Id. 342, 343; *Kellogg v. Krauser*, 14 S. & R. 137, 142; *Laney v. Bradford*, 4 Rich. 1; *Beaubien v. Cicotte*, 12

Mich. 507. Not only was it a local peculiarity, it was a troublesome and mischievous one. Unless the jury could have a view of the property in question they could not generally have satisfactory evidence of its value, and if they could have a view of it their information would generally have been greatly increased by the opinions of persons familiar with the property and with circumstances affecting its value. It was unjust; it often resulted in excessive, often insufficient damages. It was expensive and annoying; the parties were compelled to summon a greater number of witnesses than would have been necessary if their opinions could have been taken, and the process of obtaining from them such testimony as they were allowed to give, and excluding their opinions, was difficult and tedious. It was inconsistent with itself. Before the decision of *Low v. Railroad*, in 1864, witnesses were allowed to testify that other similar property had been actually sold for a certain price: *Hackett v. B. C. & M. Railroad*, 35 N. H. 390, 392, 398; their statement of the similarity of property involved their opinion, as was suggested by Judge WILCOX in *Whipple v. Walpole*, 10 N. H. 131, and by Judge PARKER in *Beard v. Kirk*, 11 Id. 401. The witness who was not permitted to say that he thought a certain horse was worth more or less than a thousand dollars, was permitted to give his opinion of the age, size, weight, form, speed, strength, endurance, health, appetite, docility, timidity, and general disposition of the horse. He was permitted to give his opinion on these points, because his statement of facts without opinion was not the best evidence; and for the same reason the common law allows him to give his opinion of the value. The great legal objection to *Rochester v. Chester* is, that it was a violation of the elementary rule of law which allows the best evidence to be given of which the case in its nature is susceptible. Opinions are the best evidence "where language is not adapted to convey those circumstances on which the judgment must be formed:" *Clark v. Baird*, 9 N. Y. 183, 196. Opinions are the best evidence when "from the nature of the subject to be investigated it cannot be so described in language as to enable persons not eye-witnesses to form an accurate judgment in regard to it. \* \* \* No description of a sled could enable a jury to judge as accurately of its value as one who had an opportunity of examining it. Two sleds may be made of the same materials and the same dimensions, and the value of one be three times that of the other; as two horses may have legs of the same length, heads of the same size, and hair of the same color, and yet be widely different in value:" *De Witt v. Barley*, 17 N. Y. 342, 343.

Opinions, like other testimony, are competent in the class of cases in which they are the best evidence, as when a mere description without opinion would generally convey a very imperfect idea of the force, meaning, and inherent evidence of the things described. Like other testimony, opinions are incompetent in the class of cases in which they are not the best evidence, as when they are founded on hearsay, or on evidence from which the jury can form an opinion as well as the witness. A rule that opinions are or are not evidence must necessarily be in conflict with the rule which admits the best evidence. A constant observer of the trial of cases examining the testimony for the purpose of ascertaining how many opinions are received and how many rejected, will find ten of the former as often as he finds one of the latter; and if

he is very critical he will find the ratio much greater than that. Opinions are constantly given. A case can hardly be tried without them. Their number is so vast and their use so habitual that they are not noticed as opinions distinguished from other evidence.

"It has been said that a witness must not be examined in chief as to his *belief* or *persuasion*, but only as to his knowledge of the fact, since judgment must be given *secundum allegata et probata*; and a man cannot be indicted for perjury who falsely swears as to his persuasion or belief. As far as regards mere belief or persuasion which does not rest upon a sufficient and legal foundation, this position is *correct*; as where a man believes a fact to be true merely because he has *heard* it said to be so; but with respect to persuasion or belief, as founded on facts within the actual knowledge of the witness, the position is not true. On questions of identity of persons and of handwriting it is every day's practice for witnesses to swear that they believe the person to be the same, or the handwriting to be that of a particular individual, although they will not swear positively; and the degree of credit to be attached to the evidence is a question for the jury. With regard to the second objection it has been decided that a man who falsely swears that he thinks or believes, may be indicted for perjury." 1 Stark. Ev. 153.

The cases of identity of persons and things and of handwriting having been named in the English books, as illustrations of the competency of opinions, those cases were supposed to be peculiar exceptions to the general rule, whereas they are mere instances of the application of the general rule which admits the best evidence. This general, natural, fundamental, comprehensive, and chief rule of evidence was gradually ignored, and special and artificial rules were substituted; or if there was not an absolute substitution, there was such a removal of emphasis from the general rule to the special ones that the former lost the overshadowing influence and control which belong to it. Entire systems of law, theology, medicine, and philosophy are easily changed by a transfer of emphasis from one point to another. To say the least, the emphasis which belongs to the general rule admitting the best evidence was gradually taken from it and placed upon the fact that there are some opinions which, not being the best evidence, are not evidence; and this fact was gradually transformed into a so-called general rule that opinions are not evidence, and this artificial rule was treated as a rule of law. The objection to this supposed rule against opinions is, that it has usurped the place of the supreme rule admitting the best evidence; that it is a mere statement of the supposed fact that opinions are not admitted under the rule of the best evidence, and that as a statement of that kind it is not true.

The local peculiarity of *Rochester v. Chester* tended strongly to build up and give unlimited emphasis to the supposed rule against opinions. If a farmer could not give his opinion of the value of his neighbor's farm, horse, or sled, of a ton of hay or bushel of potatoes, there was a difficulty in showing on what ground he could give his opinion of his neighbor's sanity. The legislature restored the common law in reference to opinions of values; the court ought to restore the common law in reference to opinions of sanity.

The anomaly of our present practice is easily traced to its source. The innovation and error of *Poole v. Richardson* crept into this state



surreptitiously between 1848 and 1865, after it had been kept out more than forty years, and after the formal attempt to introduce it in *State v. Corey* had signally failed. Being open to all, and more than all, the objections made against *Rochester v. Chester*, and having lost its sole support when that innovation and error was swept away, it should be allowed to disappear.

When the fact that some opinions are not the best evidence had been magnified and turned into the so-called general rule of law that opinions are not evidence, and the rule admitting the best evidence was supplanted by it, it was thought necessary to find a special precedent for every opinion before it could be admitted. The judgments of Westminster Hall were searched to find a decision that an opinion as to value of property was competent; and to find another decision that an opinion as to sanity was competent. No such decisions could be found. None had ever been made because such opinions had always been received as unquestionably competent. The reason of the failure to find the decisions was not understood here. The failure was taken as conclusive proof that in England the opinions were not admitted. When an American mistake of this magnitude is discovered it is fit to be corrected at once. To return to the true principle, is not to change the law but to cease violating the law; or, putting it in a milder form, to allow that which is the law *de facto* to yield to that which is the law *de jure*.

In criminal cases, it is often a question how nearly a footprint in earth or snow, corresponded to the form of a shoe of the prisoner. A witness who has seen the footprint and the shoe, is allowed to give his opinion on the subject, because a mere description of forms would not be the best evidence. If a plaster cast of the track, or the original impression itself preserved by freezing, could be produced, this evidence of its form would be more satisfactory than any verbal description. So it is when an impression has been made upon the mind of a witness by the appearance and conduct of the prisoner, indicating sanity or insanity; that impression is the best evidence the witness can give on the subject. His description of the appearance and conduct is, in fact, but indirect and imperfect evidence of the impression; when he gives the original impression itself, it is as if a footprint were brought into court.

In 1795, Sir A. G. Kinloch was tried for the murder of his brother Sir Francis Kinloch: 25 St. Tr. 891, 985. Sir Francis, in making an attempt to seize and confine the defendant, had been killed by him. The defence was insanity. In the argument of Mr. Hope for the defendant, the weight of opinions of insanity was presented in this manner: "And now, gentlemen, in the face of all this evidence, in opposition to the opinion of every friend who saw him, in opposition to the advice of every professional person consulted on the occasion; in opposition to the impression of the family; to the attempt of Sir Francis: you, sitting here, wanting the strong evidence which they had, his eyes, his looks, his gestures, his tones, his whole demeanor; you, sitting here, I say, are desired presumptuously to determine that all, all were mistaken; that the prisoner was not mad, and coercion not necessary; and this you are desired to do;—Why? Because he killed his brother! Wonderful conclusion! If anything was wanting to confirm the evidence arising from the opinion of the family, that fatal event puts it beyond doubt. If it could be doubted whether Sir Francis too thought him totally

deranged; I answer, he has sealed his opinion with his blood. They had been taking precautions all night against danger and mischief from the prisoner; and when the dreaded mischief happens, it is given you as a proof that their precautions were unnecessary; admirable logic! That they apprehended danger is clear.—Why? They have told you because they thought him mad; the mischief happens; and that which they dreaded as the natural consequence of his madness, you are to take as a proof of the soundness of his understanding.” If the evidence thus argued by Mr. Hope was inadmissible, the court should not have allowed him to make that argument. But if a prosecuting officer should object to such an argument being made, was there ever a court that would sustain the objection?

A non-expert may testify that, in his opinion, the plaintiff was sincerely attached to the defendant (*McKee v. Nelson*, 4 Cow. 355, cited as law in *Robertson v. Stark*, 15 N. H. 114); that the plaintiff “seemed satisfied” with a business arrangement proposed to him by the witness (*Bradley v. S. F. M. Co.*, 30 N. H. 487, 491); that the witness thought a horse “was not then sound, \* \* \* his feet appeared to have a disease of long standing” (*Willis v. Quimby*, 31 N. H. 485, 487); that a horse “appeared to be well, and free from disease, that he travelled well, ate well, breathed freely”; that “running him round the yard he showed distress in his breathing”; that he thought he “never saw any indication of the horse being diseased” (*Spear v. Richardson*, 34 N. H. 428, 429, 430, 431); that there were, at a certain place, “some hard excavations, but nothing approaching the nature of hard pan” (*Currier v. B. & M. Railroad*, 34 N. H. 498, 501, 508); that a lady’s health, in the opinion of the witness, “had not been near so good since” a certain time “as before,” “that she had a very severe fit of sickness in the fall of 1861, and that she recovered very slowly after she began to mend,” that the witness “considered her very sick”; that the defendant, in carrying a barrel of flour at one time, and a barrel of sugar at another, “seemed to carry them easily”; “that he should call the defendant a very active man”; “that he had a scuffle with” the defendant, in which the defendant “was too much for him” (*State v. Knapp*, 45 N. H. 148, 149, 154); that the witness “did not see any appearance of fright” in a horse at the time of an accident, that the horse “did not appear to be frightened in the least, before he went off the bank or afterwards,” that “he appeared to be rather a sulky-dispositioned horse to use” (*Whittier v. Franklin*, 46 N. H. 23); that a carriage not seen by the witness, appeared, from the sound, to start from a certain point (*State v. Shinborn*, 46 N. H. 497, 501); that the plaintiff “seemed to suffer, and seemed weak and debilitated,” that “she did not seem to be excited, frightened,” that “she was lamer in the morning” than the day before (*Taylor v. Railroad*, 48 N. H. 304, 306, 309); and, since the restoration of the common law, opinions of the value of property are admitted here as well as everywhere else.

If opinions of physical condition are competent, opinions of mental condition must be competent. The difficulty of proving physical health or disease, without opinion, makes opinion a legal grade of best evidence; the difficulty of proving mental health or disease, without opinion, is still greater, and makes opinion more palpably a class of best evidence.

Lord Hale recognised the similarity of insanity and intoxication, and

treated of both under the head of "Idiocy, Madness, and Lunacy." After describing "*dementia naturalis*," and "*dementia accidentalis*," he says, "The third sort of *dementia* is that which is *dementia affectata*, namely *drunkenness*. This vice doth deprive men of the use of reason, and puts many men into a perfect but temporary phrenzy; \* \* \* such a person shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses": 1 Hale P. C. 32.

In this case, it is unanimously decided that witnesses, not experts, were properly allowed to testify that, at times the defendant did appear, and at times did not appear, to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Admitting opinions of the influence of alcohol, and rejecting opinions of insanity, is arbitrary. It was not so in Judge RICHARDSON's day. In *State v. Corey*, one witness testified there was one time when he saw the defendant "*out*—cannot say whether he had been drinking or not"; and several testified that they had "never known of his being deranged except from liquor." Exclude opinions of the influence of alcohol, and, in many cases, it would be a trying task for the jury to guess, upon the evidence, whether the defendant was intoxicated or insane. The appearances and conduct which gave to one witness an impression that this defendant was intoxicated, may have given to others the impression that he was insane; and when a man is on trial for his life, the state is not entitled to a monopoly of the opinions.

Under the exception of *Poole v. Richardson*, counsel who have introduced evidence tending to show insanity, have, in most, if not in all, cases, been painfully aware of the fact that their client's cause suffered unjustly from the suppression of an important class of the best evidence. The exclusion of opinions is practically a one-sided exclusion. A witness for the state is allowed to say that the defendant appeared natural or as usual; that is a clear opinion; and it is understood and taken by the counsel, court, and jury as a full and explicit opinion that the defendant was sane. If the witness should testify in terms, that, in his opinion, the defendant was sane, the effect of his testimony would not be altered in the slightest degree. On the other side, a witness is allowed to say that the defendant did not appear natural, or did appear peculiarly or strangely; that also is a clear opinion; and if it were necessarily understood and taken as a full and explicit opinion that the defendant was insane, there would be no injustice, and the exception excluding opinions would be totally abolished. If "*unnatural*," by its peculiar use in this connection, should, in evidence, come to be synonymous with "*insane*," as "*natural*" is understood to be synonymous with "*sane*," the legal question now under consideration would dwindle to a point of literary taste. But the effect of the opinion that the defendant did not appear natural, or did appear peculiarly or strangely, falls far short of the effect of an opinion that he appeared to be insane; and the state has this great and unfair advantage over the accused. If he has feigned insanity for the purpose of escaping punishment, a mere narration by the witnesses of their observations of him, would probably appear like very strong evidence of insanity; whereas this evidence might be properly and truthfully rebutted by their opinions; they might have observed evidence of simulation which they could not describe. And

thus the modern, eccentric, *nisi prius* ruling supposed by Mr. Tyng to have been made in *Poole v. Richardson*, and unfortunately published by him, operates unavoidably to oppress and endanger the accused, who, by reason of insanity, are innocent; and to encourage crime by shielding the guilty who feign insanity. Objectionable as the new dogma is in all the details of its practical operation, it is also, in a purely legal view, a violation of the elementary principle which admits the best evidence. \* \* \*

We have inserted the foregoing opinion, chiefly, because of the learning and ability, as well as the exhaustive thoroughness of that portion of the dissenting opinion of Dow, J., upon the question of the admissibility of the opinions of unprofessional witnesses in regard to apparent insanity, in connection with the detail of the facts upon which such opinions are based. The learned judge shows, very conclusively, both upon authority and reason, that the opinion of the unprofessional witnesses in such cases is commonly far more reliable, as a basis of ultimate decision, in questions of sanity and mental capacity, than any specific facts which could possibly be gathered from the witnesses.

We have said, in our book on Wills, and in other places, all that we could

desire to say both as to the rationale of the rule and the support which it receives from authority. The tendency of the American courts, in the last few years, has been largely in the direction contended for by the learned judge; and there seems to be little question it must ultimately prevail all but universally. We should rejoice at such a result as greatly tending towards the establishment of truth, with greater facility and certainty, in a very important class of cases.

We cannot doubt the profession will regard this opinion as one of great value upon this question, and as presenting the decisions bearing upon it more exhaustively than can be found in any other place.

I. F. R.

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### *Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.*

#### GARSED ET AL. v. TURNER.

Instruction to the jury that "If the contract was broken by the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to be put in the same position, pecuniarily, as he would have been, if the contract had been kept, regard being had to the fact that plaintiff soon after obtained other employment," held correct.

ERROR to the District Court of Philadelphia.

*A. D. Campbell, George M. Dallas, and James E. Gowen*, for plaintiffs in error.

*Richard P. White and George H. Earle*, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WILLIAMS, J.—The principal question in this case relates to the proper measure of damages for the breach of the alleged contract. The District Court instructed the jury that "if the contract was broken by the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to be put in the same position,